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Abstract—Locational Marginal Price (LMP) is a dual variable
associated with supply-demand matching and represents the cost
of delivering power to a particular location if the load at that
location increases. In recent times it become more volatile due to
increased integration of renewables that are intermittent. The
issue of price volatility is further heightened during periods
of grid congestion. Motivated by these problems, we propose
a market design where, by constraining dual variables, we
determine the amount of demand-side flexibility required to
limit the rise of LMP. Through our proposed approach a price
requesting load can specify its maximum willingness to pay
for electricity and through demand-side flexibility hedge against
price volatility. For achieving this, an organizational structure for
flexibility management is proposed that exhibits the coordination
required between the Distribution System Operator (DSO), an
aggregator and the price requesting load. To demonstrate the
viability of our proposed formulation, we run an illustrative
simulation under infinite and finite line capacities.
I. INTRODUCTION
Large scale integration of distributed energy resources, such
as wind and solar, poses both advantages and challenges for
power systems. While it positively contributes to the reduction
of carbon footprint of electricity, one of the issues related to
the variability of distributed energy resources is that of price
volatility. Demand side uncertainty in addition to intermittency
in generation supply can cause the prices to be volatile in
electricity markets [1]. Price spikes, which are an extreme of
price volatility, occur when there are no price-responsive loads,
enabling generators to exercise market power; or when there
is limited supply in energy markets to satisfy peak loads or
during periods of grid congestion [2].
Price volatility due to intermittent nature of renewables is
observed in different regions around the world such as in Spain
[3], Australia [4], Denmark [5], Germany [6], and Texas [7].
In some locations supply-side flexibility options in the form
of hydropower [3], [5] or cross-border power flow [5] is able
to address price volatility caused by the increased integration
of renewables. However, supply-side flexibility options are
subject to grid congestions which could possibly lead to
price spikes. In [8] the adoption of demand-side flexibility
in addition to supply-side is recommended to address issues
such as market power of generators, reducing price spikes and
price volatility, which in turn can support higher integration of
renewables. In this paper, we are concerned with the demand-
side flexibility, which can be availed from energy storage and
demand response, and is defined as the ability of a power
system to modify consumption in reaction to an external signal
such as price.
To address the issue of price volatility and price spikes both
regulatory and technology based approaches have previously
been investigated. From a regulatory perspective research in
[2] proposes an optimal combination of the time-of-use and
incentive based demand response with a focus on customer
comfort. Similarly, [9] focuses on analyzing the consumer
reaction and their willingness to shift demand under demand
response programs. In contrast, the optimal size of energy
storage as a demand-side flexibility resource for addressing
price volatility in a renewable generation-dominant electricity
market is investigated in [10].
Hedging has also been used as an approach for addressing
price volatility and price spikes. In [11] the research focuses
on the potential of Energy Efficiency as a hedging mechanism,
which is similar to long-term energy contracts. With regards
to short-term operational time frame hedging against price
fluctuation, a comparative analysis between forward contracts,
call options and incentivizing end-consumers for flexibility
provision is performed in [12]. In the context of our research,
hedging is defined to be similar to the concept of Forward
Contracts [13] where the consumer wants to ensure that in
the day-ahead market, they do not pay a price higher than
their maximum willingness to pay. To illustrate this, assume
that the consumers maximum willingness to pay is e70/MWh.
For determining the price of electricity, we use the concept
of Locational Marginal Price (LMP) which comprises of the
marginal cost of generation and cost of network congestion
[14]. If the LMP is e80/MWh, the consumer then to ensure
that they pay at their maximum willingness to pay would need
to offer energy flexibility through demand-side management.
The question that we answer in this paper is: How can demand-
side flexibility be used to hedge against price volatility in a
distribution grid with distributed generation? To address this
question, we use a concept presented in [15] to constrain the
marginal prices to the maximum willingness of a consumer to
pay for electricity.
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The paper provides novel contributions to the scientific
community, by investigating the possibility of using flexibility
through demand-side management to hedge against electric
price volatility. While there exists limited research on the ap-
plicability of demand-side flexibility as an alternative hedging
mechanism, an approach that is able to quantify the energy
flexibility required while accounting for operational constraints
such as grid congestion are lacking.
The hedging mechanism proposed in this paper can also be
extended to the transmission grid. However, large industrial
consumers in this grid, generally have long-term bilateral
contracts with their energy provider and are hence protected
against price volatility. Our focus in this paper is on the distri-
bution grid and the entities connected to it such as small-scale
industrial, commercial or residential consumers. The hedging
mechanism presented in this paper could provide beneficial to
the distribution grid based market entities, especially under
the assumption of future institutional arrangements where
dynamic pricing is adopted in distribution grid markets to
enable more demand response and consumer participation.
The second contribution of our paper is an Organizational
Structure for the coordination between the Distribution System
Operator (DSO) and aggregator for demand-side flexibility
management at the distribution grid. Lack of coordination
between DSO and aggregators can have negative impacts on
the operation of the distribution grid. As an example, research
conducted in [16] illustrates that profit-seeking aggregators
that try to benefit from price fluctuations can inadvertently
cause congestion in the distribution grid. Our proposed ap-
proach is able to provide insights on how energy flexibility
management through DSO-aggregator coordination can hedge
against price volatility and price spikes in electricity markets.
The structure of this paper is as follows: first we present
the problem formulation using duality theory to constrain
dual variables and its impact on the primal problem. We then
explain its application to the optimal power flow problem and
the institutional arrangement between the DSO and aggregator
for flexibility management in distribution grids. An illustrative
case study is then presented from which insights on the
business opportunity for aggregators are drawn. Finally we
summarize our findings and give recommendations for future
research.
II. POWER FLOW FORMULATION FOR HEDGING AGAINST
PRICE VOLATILITY USING DEMAND-SIDE FLEXIBILITY
In this Section, we illustrate the impact of constraining
dual variables on the primal problem in the setting of an
optimal power flow formulation. For doing so, we will build
on the formulation that was previously introduced in [15].
We assume that the consumers, in order to hedge against
the price volatility can use demand-side flexible resources.
The formulation for determining the amount of demand-side
flexibility required for constraining prices is presented in the
following sub-sections.
A. Economic Dispatch Formulation
In Economic Dispatch, all generators and loads are consid-
ered to be connected to the same bus, thereby ignoring physical
network constraints. We assume the consumer derives utility
of eb/MWh from load consumption and pays ea/MWh for
it. As an entity, the customer would prefer to maximize its
utility function through flexible consumption of electricity, and
the upper and lower bounds for this are defined by PL and
PL respectively. Neglecting network losses, this formulation
is expressed as follows:
maximize
PG,PL
bPL − aPG
subject to PL ≤ PL ≤ PL : µ1, µ2
PG − PL = 0 : λ
PG, PL ≥ 0
(1)
Dual variables µ1, µ2 and λ associated with the load con-
sumption limits and power balance are introduced. As the
primal problem is linear in nature, the problem has convex
characteristics, and Slater’s condition will hold [17]. This
implies that the optimal value of the dual problem is equal
to that of the primal problem. We now introduce a constraint
on the LMP such that it has to be less than or equal to the
maximum willingness of a consumer to pay for electricity,
pides. The modified dual problem is expressed in (2).
minimize
µ1,µ2,λ
− PLµ1 + PLµ2
subject to − µ1 + µ2 − λ ≥ b
λ ≤ pides
µ1, µ2, pi
des ≥ 0
(2)
Adding a constraint on the LMP (λ) in the dual formulation,
introduces a new variable in the primal problem. This new
variable is defined as P flexreq, and is the amount of demand-
side flexibility required to constrain the LMP to the consumer’s
maximum willingness to pay, i.e. λ ≤ pides. The modified
primal problem is:
maximize
PG,PL,P flexreq
bPL − aPG − pidesP flexreq
subject to PG − PL + P flexreq = 0
PL ≤ PL ≤ PL
PG, PL, P
flexreq ≥ 0
(3)
B. Economic Dispatch formulation with Network Flows
The physical line capacity of the grid may further influence
price volatility. The physical structure of our distribution grid
is shown in Figure 1. This three bus system is taken for
simplicity and the formulation can be extended for larger grids.
In Figure 1, at Bus 1 the distribution grid is connected to the
transmission grid and it is considered to be the slack bus. Dis-
tributed energy resources are integrated to the distribution grid
at Bus 2. The consumer who requests a price is referred to as a
Price Requesting Load and is connected at Bus 3, which is the
price constrained bus. For modeling the cost of transmission
Fig. 1: Simple grid for illustrating proposed hedging strategy
grid we use the wholesale market prices, expressed as atrans
for the marginal cost and constant cost ctrans values. Similarly,
the cost of distributed energy resources is expressed using
marginal and constant costs as adist and cdist respectively.
The utility function of the price requesting load is comprised
of marginal utility bload and constant utility cload values. The
utility maximization formulation over 24 hours is as follows:
maximize
PG,PL,P flexreq
24∑
l=1
bloadl (P
load)l + c
load
l − atransl P transl
−ctransl − adistl P distl − cdistl − pidesl P flexreql
(4)
subject to:
(PGil )− (PLil ) =
∑
j∈Ωi
θil − θjl
Xij
, ∀i ∈ N\K (4a)
(PGkl )−(PLkl )+(P
flexreq
kl
) =
∑
j∈Ωk
θkl − θjl
Xkj
∀k ∈ K (4b)
θ1 = 0 (4c)
PLi ≤ (PLil ) ≤ PLi ∀i ∈ N (4d)
− Pij ≤ θil − θjl
Xij
≤ Pij ∀(i, j) ∈ Ωij (4e)
0 ≤ (PGil ) ≤ PGi ∀i ∈ N (4f)
P flexreqkl ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ K (4g)
Sets N, K, Ωi, Ωk and Ωij represent the set of all nodes in
the system, the price constrained nodes, buses connected to
Bus i and Bus k, and the network lines respectively. Equa-
tion (4a) represents the general power balance across nodes,
while Equation (4b) expresses the power balance at the price
requesting node where demand-side flexibility is provided.
Through (4c) we express Bus 1 as the angle reference bus.
The minimum and maximum bounds on loads at each bus, the
line flow limits, upper and lower bounds on generation and
positivity constraint on required flexibility is stated through
Equations (4d)-(4g) respectively.
III. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE
We propose an Organizational Structure, in association with
the physical structure presented in Figure 1, through which
we focus on actor interaction and information flow. In Figure
2, a Price Requesting Load is situated at Bus 3 of Figure
1, who communicates it’s maximum willingness to pay for
electricity, pides, to the DSO. It is expected that the DSO
in a future electricity market will be a regulated market
facilitator in the distribution grid [18]. Thus, the DSO being
the only entity having information about generation costs, the
maximum willingness to pay of the price requesting load, as
well as the physical structure of the network, is able to run
the optimal power flow formulated in (4).
Fig. 2: Financial and Information Flow
Executing the optimal power flow with pides specified
enables the DSO to determine the required demand-side
flexibility for constraining the LMP. If the LMP is lower
than pides, then no additional flexibility is required. However,
if the LMP is greater than pides, then the DSO determines
the amount of flexibility required (P flexreq > 0). The DSO
then, on behalf of the price requesting load, issues a request
for demand-side flexibility to an aggregator. In response, the
aggregator controls a demand-side flexible resource to provide
the flexibility required to constrain the LMP to the pides
specified. The aggregator, is remunerated for its services by the
price requesting load. In this paper, a simplistic remuneration
scheme for the aggregator is proposed based on the difference
in the LMP and specified pides, and the amount of flexibility
that the aggregator provides to constrain the LMP. For a 24
hour period, the revenue at each hour is represented in (5).
R =
24∑
l=1
(λl − pidesl )× P flexreqkl (5)
For hour l, λl represents the LMP without any demand-side
flexibility and P flexreqkl represents the amount of demand-side
flexibility provided by the aggregator at the price requesting
load bus. In practice, the aggregator’s revenue is dependent
on the amount of energy flexibility that the aggregator could
provide at a given instance to constrain the prices. Further-
more, the aggregator’s revenue should be less than the cost of
dispatching energy from the next available and more expensive
generator, otherwise the prices would not be constrained at
the consumer specified value. In terms of risk, by investing
in a demand-side flexible resource and providing flexibility,
the Aggregator is taking over the risk of price volatility and
price spikes from the price requesting load on to themselves.
Hence, the aggregator’s revenue is contingent on the amount
of price volatility and price spikes in the electricity market.
IV. SIMULATION AND RESULTS
For understanding how the presented optimal power flow
formulation with constrained LMP determines the amount of
flexibility required, we run an illustrative simulation using
Equation (4). To perform our simulation, we use synthetic
data based on the Amsterdam Power Exchange (APX) [19],
such that the variable pitrans represents a 24 hour time series
data. The cost of distributed energy resources (adist, cdist) is
assumed by scaling down the value of the wholesale market
prices by 30% and then sampling 24 random points within the
range. Similarly, the load utility values (bload, cload) are set
by sampling 24 random values within the values of atrans and
adist. The network structure used in the following simulation
corresponds to Figure 1 and has x12 = x13 = x23 = 0.1p.u.
reactance with the maximum flows under infinite and finite
line capacities as 1.0MW and 0.6MW respectively.
A. Price Hedging under Infinite Line Capacity
Power flows across the network under this simulation are
not constrained and the marginal cost coefficient of the trans-
mission system (atrans) is higher than that of the distributed
energy sources adist. This implies that according to the merit
order, the distributed energy resources will be dispatched first.
However, owing to their intermittent nature, the upper limit
on the amount of energy that can be drawn from them is
variable, and may not be sufficient to supply the load by
themselves. Hence, energy import from the transmission grid
would be required to satisfy the residual demand, making the
transmission grid based generation as the marginal generator.
Due to infinite line capacity, the LMP will be the same across
all the buses and equal to the cost of the marginal generator.
The price requesting load at Bus 3, if it wants to hedge
against the electricity price volatility, can specify its maximum
willingness to pay for electricity directly to the DSO. DSO,
having all the information it requires, can compute the amount
of flexibility required for constraining the LMP. For our
simulation purposes, we assume that the maximum willingness
to pay for electricity is pides=e70/MWh. It is observed from
Figure 3, that when the LMP crosses the price threshold of
pides=e70/MWh at hour 9, the DSO would need to compute
the flexibility required for constraining the LMP and commu-
nicate this information to the aggregator.
Figure 3(a) shows the LMP when the price is unconstrained
and constrained. The quantification of demand-side flexibility
is displayed through Figure 3(b) where we see the energy
import from the expensive transmission grid based generation,
and Figure 3(c) where demand-side flexibility can be provi-
sioned to substitute this import thereby constraining prices.
As an example, at hour 18, we observe that the proposed
hedging mechanism can lead to a difference of e6.9/MWh.
To achieve this hedging, the DSO computes and determines
the flexibility required to be 0.33MW, which is then requested
Fig. 3: Overview of constraining prices by specifying the
Maximum Willingness to pay for Electricity under infinite line
capacity: (a) LMP at Price Requesting Load with and without
demand-side flexibility (b) Power supply without demand-side
flexibility (c) Power supply with demand-side flexibility
from the aggregator. The aggregator having the amount of
flexibility required (P flexreq) specified, is able to directly
control a demand-side based flexible resource thereby provi-
sioning flexibility. Hence, at hour 18, the price requesting load
with pides = e70/MWh is able to hedge e6.9/MWh by using
0.33MW of demand-side flexibility and the aggregator would
be remunerated by e2.28 for that hour.
B. Price Hedging under Finite Line Capacity
The main difference in this case, as compared to Section
IV-A, is the impact of finite power flow capacity. Line con-
gestion limit between Bus 2 and Bus 3 is set to 0.6MW.
This implies that during periods of line congestion, even
though the load at Bus 3 could be satisfied by the cheaper
distributed energy resources, it would not be feasible due
to the binding physical constraint. Furthermore, the LMP
value now comprises of an additional network congestion
cost. This manifests itself as price spikes that are observed at
Bus 3. These price spikes are undesirable from a consumer’s
perspective.
In Figure 4(a), price spikes are observed during the period of
line congestion from hours 14-22. As observed in Figure 4(b),
this period corresponds to that of increased energy import from
the transmission grid which is more expensive. By specifying
their maximum willingness to pay for electricity pides to the
DSO and eventually availing flexibility from the aggregator,
the price requesting load is able to hedge against the price
spikes. For constraining the prices, the amount of flexibility
that is required is computed by the DSO and is depicted in
Figure 4(c). At hour 17 for example, by provisioning 0.35MW
of flexibility, the aggregator can cause a price difference of
e55.14/MWh.The aggregator for its services would receive
a remuneration of e19.3 for that hour, an amount which
is significantly larger as compared to price hedging in the
absence of price spikes.
Fig. 4: Overview of constraining prices by specifying the
Maximum Willingness to pay for Electricity under finite line
capacity: (a) LMP at Price Requesting Load with and without
demand-side flexibility (b) Power supply without demand-side
flexibility (c) Power supply with demand-side flexibility
C. Aggregator Revenue
In Section III, we expressed the revenue that the aggrega-
tor could receive from a price requesting load for demand-
side flexibility over a 24 hour period. Using our presented
formulation, we determined the amount of flexibility that the
aggregator would need to provide for hedging against price
volatility and price spikes. Using Table I, we calculate the
sensitivity of aggregator’s revenue to the maximum willingness
to pay of a price requesting load.
TABLE I: Aggregator Revenue under different pides values
pides Uncongested Congested
e68/MWh e17.03 e129.44
e70/MWh e9.22 e106.97
e72/MWh e3.95 e89.67
From Table I, we see that as the difference between the LMP
and pides increases, the aggregator generates more revenue.
Additionally, price spikes due to grid congestions can further
increase money inflow for the aggregator. Given the results,
it can be stated that there exists a business opportunity for
aggregators.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented a formulation to estimate the
amount of demand-side flexibility that is required to hedge
against electricity price volatility and price spikes caused by
grid congestions. An organizational structure between DSO,
aggregator and price requesting load for coordinating flexi-
bility in distribution grids is proposed. By constraining the
marginal price to the consumer’s maximum willingness to pay
for electricity, we use duality theory in quantifying the amount
of flexibility required to perform hedging under infinite and
finite line capacities. Accompanying simulation studies illus-
trate how line flows, generation profiles and flexible demand
are affected by the proposed hedging mechanism.
These results can be extended in several new directions.
Different contractual arrangements along with quantification of
risk transfer between the DSO, aggregator and price requesting
load for flexibility management will be explored. The results
presented here do not account for inter-temporal constraints
and losses in the power system and this will also be a focus
of future research. Finally, a financial feasibility analysis of
the proposed approach, in which we account for the cost of
flexible resources, is required.
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